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“The British and American War: Cultural Conflict in the Seven Years’ War” 
Paper Presented to the CAAS Conference, University of Windsor 
Oct. 16, 2010 
 
In August 1758, after the fall of Louisbourg, James Wolfe opined: “The Americans are in 
general the dirtiest most contemptible cowardly dogs that you can conceive. There is no 
depending on them in action. They fall down dead in their own dirt and desert by battalions, 
officers and all. Such rascals as those are rather an encumbrance than any real strength to an 
army.”i Just as the tide turned in the Seven Years’ War, it would appear that an identity for the 
American soldier was crystallizing. Though Wolfe had been in the colonies but a few months, 
his opinion of the American had hardened into non-complementary cast, preconceived notions 
setting to certitude in war. While Wolfe wrote of American soldiers, British army officers 
broadly shared such views and extended the criticism to colonial politicians and the general 
population, deemed unsupportive and obstructionist at worse and ineffectual at best in their 
support of the war effort. Colonial soldiers, for their part, found regular army officers officious 
and condescending, and their application of discipline cruel and unusual. Colonists, more 
generally, deemed the British army to be demanding of resources, unmindful of how colonial 
politics worked, uncaring of matters of private property and individual liberties, and neglectful of 
the subordination of military to civil power within British constitutionalism; seeming at times 
more an occupying than a protective force. From this juncture of allied peoples flowed much 
conflict producing as often a sense of difference as a shared identity as Britons. 
Writing from the years of revolutionary struggle, J. Hector St John De Crevecoeur sought to 
pin down the identity of the emergent American people when he asked: “What then is the 
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American, this new man?”ii Historians have long been as interested in the timing of this creation, 
whether the American preceded the Revolution or vice versa. David Hackett Fisher wrote of four 
distinct regional folkways from Britain transplanted to the New World in a series of migrations 
dating to initial colonization, taking root in specific regions of the colonies. Add to the mix a 
number of other regional cultures that formed, and the colonies produced a patchwork of cultures 
rather than a singular identity on the eve of the Revolution. Likewise, Michael Zuckerman 
maintained that, although “the colonists of British America always strove to be Britons.” There 
existed at most a colony-based identity, evident only in the more densely settled regions, and still 
fragmented by ethnic, religious and other divisions. A common identity only began to form in 
the Revolution, he affirmed.iii Jack P. Greene also noted that, as the power and pull of 
metropolitan culture grew in the mid eighteenth century “there was a self-conscious effort to 
anglicize colonial life through the deliberate imitation of metropolitan institutions, values and 
culture.” Demographic and economic growth, increasing urbanization, general prosperity, and 
political maturation fostered cultural convergence. “Out of this steady process of convergence 
emerged the beginnings of an American cultural order that was waiting to be defined during and 
immediately after the era of the American Revolution.”iv All these historians look to the 
Revolution as the central event and to the colonists themselves as the key actors in the formation 
of American identity. Conversely, Timothy Breen argued that the assertion of an aggressive 
identity by Britain in the mid-eighteenth century had the effect of marginalizing the colonial 
periphery. Colonists partook of this patriotism into the 1760s when British actions such as the 
Stamp Act prompted a backlash to their perceived exclusion from being Britons. It was the 
British who, through their imperial agenda, constructed the idea of the American as something 
lesser than the Briton. Growing American proto-nationalism flowed from this differentiation.v  
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Fred Anderson closely examined the military sphere and traced the formation of an American 
identity to the Seven Years’ War. Being thrown into close contact with regular troops the 
provincial soldiers of the colonies noted a number of key cultural differences with their British 
compatriots that contributed to the formation of a separate identity. “The war was an education 
for both sides, and the lessons that New England soldiers learned reinforced their cultural 
heritage and their sense of themselves as a distinct people.”vi  
Having, for the most part, benefited from the benign neglect of the metropole during much of 
the preceding 150 years, a new, assertive and intrusive imperial state invaded the colonial 
periphery during the Seven Years’ War in the form of the British army. The fiscal and military 
demands made by Britain upon its colonies, although the norm at home since the late 17th 
century, struck the colonies with blunt force. In fact, the colonial experience of war making in 
the Seven Years War differed from that at home at least until 1758 in a fundamental way—in the 
separation of civil and military power. The British fiscal-military state, according to John 
Brewer, arose as a result of the political crisis experienced by the state after the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. In order to protect the Protestant Succession, Parliament enabled the 
expansion of the military through the extension of fiscal institutions and state taxation, but on the 
condition that the Commons exerted public accountability over state war making, and civil law 
prevailed over military law, particularly in matters of billeting and troop movements.vii With 
these guarantees in place, the essential operation of the fiscal-military state could proceed 
covertly, visible in the form of customs and excise taxes, and long-term government borrowing, 
but its full grasp on society obscured by the ostensible absence of a standing army on English 
soil. But the state manifested itself more palpably in America during the Seven Years’ War.viii In 
1754, Whitehall decided that military authority would supersede civil power in key functions of 
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mobilization, such as the provisioning of the army and the quartering of its troops. This deviation 
from the constitutional norm manifested itself in human terms when an army ultimately 
numbering in the tens of thousands landed on American shores, and the military command issued 
direct orders to civil authorities for funding the war effort, mobilizing troops, providing support 
infrastructure and supplies, and curtailing certain commercial activities. Colonial leaders quickly 
decried the militarization of their society, pleading the rights of Englishmen to be free of a 
standing army. In reality, their status can be seen more as analogous to that other British colony, 
Ireland, which had long functioned as an island transport ship for the British army, in this way 
enabling the invisibility of British military forces on the English landscape while maintaining the 
nation’s battle readiness. Americans aspired to higher status than colonial Catholic Ireland, and 
there lie the seeds of their identity.  
The clash of interests materialized early, with General Edward Braddock, leader of the first 
wave of Britain’s new military presence in America, complaining in the spring of 1755 of the 
fractiousness and unwillingness of the colonists to contribute to a central fund to support his 
expedition. Braddock railed against the “Supineness and Neglect of their Duty they have too 
long been justly accused of,” and as his fateful march progressed, so did his discontent. 
Expecting to find 200 wagons and 2,500 horses with forage at Fort Cumberland, as promised by 
the governors of Maryland and Virginia, he encountered 20 and 200 respectively. The general 
bitterly noted the “Numberless Instances of the want of publick and private Faith, and of the 
most absolute Disregard of all Truth” among the colonists. Braddock did spare a good word for 
Benjamin Franklin, who stepped in to resolve the transport problem, stating he acted with “great 
punctuality & Integrity.”ix  
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Franklin, by comparison, writing safely from the vantage point of years after the fact, 
provided the “American” perspective on Braddock’s British invasion. “In their first march, too, 
from their landing till they got beyond the settlements, they had plundered and stripped the 
inhabitants, totally ruining some poor families, besides insulting, abusing, and confining the 
people if they remonstrated.”x Colonials found representatives of the British army, the central 
civil and military power during the war, to be officious, demanding, condescending, and at times 
oppressive. None proved more so than Braddock’s successor, James Campbell, Fourth Earl of 
Loudoun, who took command of the army in 1756. A combination of inherited aristocratic 
privilege and acquired superior military command made Loudoun authoritarian by nature and a 
man who perceived any opposition from those he deemed inferior as outright insubordination, 
and virtually everyone in the colonies he deemed to be beneath him, and those that were not by 
nature to be rendered so by the vice regal powers granted with his command. Loudoun arrived in 
New York on July 23, 1756, and shortly thereafter began expressing his opinions of colonials, 
albeit under the cover of a letters to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland. In October 
Loudoun wrote the Duke of Cumberland, at that time commander general of the British army: 
“The backwardness of the People in this Country, to give any assistance to the Service, is 
incredible.”xi Such a negative impression informed Loudoun’s actions, and the message soon 
came through clearly to the colonists as army mobilization hit North America.  
A recognition of different interests quickly emerged and conflict ensued. Briton and colonial 
mutually hammered out “the American” on the anvil of military needs—the processes of 
recruitment, supply, trade embargo, quartering, and differences in the nature of military service 
between regular soldiers and the provincial forces raised by the colonies themselves—needs with 
profound consequences for the colonies. The disputes between colonials and the army over these 
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issues were primarily economic in nature—hinging on restriction of trade, compulsory marketing 
of provisions, requisition of wagons and livestock central to the agricultural economy, recruiting 
of scarce (free and bonded) labor, and the forced quartering of troops on civilian homes and 
businesses—although the colonial leaders tended to articulate their opposition to military actions 
in terms of the defense of British liberties. This paper will concentrate on the two key issues, 
recruitment and quartering, but I will be glad to take questions on the others. 
 
Recruiting 
The supply of military labor, both the provincial troops raised by the colonies and the regular 
troops recruited by the army in the colonies, provided a flash point for internecine conflict. Every 
year the commander-in-chief informed the colonial governors of the number of provincial troops 
he expected the colonies to raise for the campaign. These numbers could prove significant for 
colonies used to perfunctory militia musters. Provincial Governors confronted colonial 
assemblies with the request for authorization of the expenditure attendant upon the mobilizing of 
these forces. As a result of the often strained relations between the executive and legislative 
branches of colonial governments, the assemblies’ control of the purse strings, and in certain 
instances the prevalence of internal sectarian politics, not to mention the reluctance of men to 
serve under what they deemed unfavorable terms, the number of provincial troops actually 
fielded often fell well short of those requested, prompting frustration in the army’s commanders. 
It must be remembered as well that the scale of mobilization demanded by the British eclipsed 
past war efforts and the economic wherewithal of the colonies, so resistance was natural.xii  
The colonies took advantage of their control over the raising of provincial troops, however 
the army exercised authority in the recruiting of colonials to the regular forces, and this subject 
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proved more contentious in the British-American relationship. Colonial resistance to British 
recruitment to the armed services, in particular impressments to the royal navy, had a long 
tradition.xiii But in the recruitment of indentured servants sparked the most controversy in the 
Seven Years’ War. The Pennsylvania House of Representatives advised the lieutenant governor 
that many masters had complained “a great Number of Bought Servants are lately inlisted by the 
Recruiting Officers now in this Province, and clandestinely or by open Force conveyed away” to 
the great oppression of the masters and the province. Moreover, the practice also harmed masters 
whose servants were not enlisted, “Since they must humour them in every thing least they should 
be provoked to enlist which they daily threaten.” Other servants pretend to enlist only to run off, 
their masters giving them up because of difficulty in reclaiming them from the army. Under the 
law masters had “as true & as just a Property in the Servant bought as they had before in the 
Money with which he was purchas’d.”xiv The concern expressed here had more to do with 
capital—the control, discipline and ownership of labor—than with constitutional matters of 
colonial versus imperial powers. 
Masters frequently took the law into their own hands to resist British recruiting parties. 
Horatio Sharpe, Governor of Maryland, warned “an Insurrection of the People is likely to 
ensue.” Corbin Lee, who managed an iron forge worked by indentured servants, complained to 
Sharp when recruiters took two of his servants. “It is not unusual with many of these recruiting 
Gentlemen when they meet with a person that will not be bullied out of his Property and tamely 
give up his Servant without any sort of Recompense immediately to deem him an Enemy to his 
Majesty’s Service.” He believed the actions of the recruiting officer to be “Illegal nay felonious; 
for they stole into our Plantations disguis’d like thieves in the dead of night made our Servants 
Drunk forced them to inlist and curried [sic] them off.”xv Problems inevitably emerged. In 1756 
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officers of the Royal American Regiment, for example, had many disputes with masters of 
servants, a few of which were going to court. Colonial lawyers, revealingly, argued that servants, 
as property, had no free will, and thus could not be taken against the masters’ wishes.xvi Masters 
also took a more direct approach in reclaiming their property. One tactic was to have enlisted 
servants jailed on some specious charge to keep them from the army’s clutches.xvii  
The army’s recruiting officers did not escape the masters’ wrath, as acting commander in 
chief William Shirley reported in 1756. “The officers have been arrested for entertaining these 
Servants, Violences used by the Populace” in Pennsylvania and Maryland “for recovering them 
from the Officers, and the Servants imprison’d for inlisting.”xviii Pieter Van Ingen, a recruiter for 
the Royal Americans, enlisted a servant of Samuel Henry at Trenton in August 1756. Henry later 
confronted him in a tavern demanding his servant or money in recompense, and struck him on 
the head with an iron-tipped stick when he refused. Van Ingen chased him off with his sword. 
Henry returned with friends in an attempt to capture the servant, but Van Ingen drove them off 
again. When he tried to leave, though, Henry attacked him with a pitchfork, which he parried 
with his sword. He retreated inside and had his men fasten knives to poles, with which they 
routed Henry’s party, which surrendered the field and the servant. But when mob rule failed, 
Henry turned to the law, and had a justice send a constable to Van Ingen demanding he give up 
the man or the money, or go to jail. Van Ingen refused and a writ was served upon him, and he 
was jailed in a “Stinking” cell without a bed, chair or fire, despite the protest of his colonel as to 
the illegality of his imprisonment.xix  
The recruitment of free individuals to the regular army also sparked official opposition and 
popular conflict. Some recruiting officers were subjected to “Vexatious Suits” in the courts of 
law for performing their duties.xx Debts owed by putative recruits were invented or inflated and 
 9 
the men incarcerated to prevent them joining the army, and keep their persons and labor in the 
local setting. The brothers Thomas Alley and Daniel Alley, both laborers, enlisted with the 40th 
regiment, but were sequestered in jail at Portmouth, where they were being held for a debt owed 
to the son of Col. Warner, a Justice and local magnate. Warner was “one of the principal Men in 
the Town & as no one hardly cares to oppose him, he generally does what he pleases.”xxi  
Other recruiting parties met with collective violence. A Philadelphia mob attacked recruiters 
in 1756, beating a sergeant to death, jailing the rest, and liberating the enlisted men. Three riots 
took place in Wilmington, Delaware in the fall of 1757, in which Independent Company 
recruiters had been beaten. The mob leaders were known but the recruiting officer did not trust 
local authorities to prosecute.xxii Colonial officials inevitably became embroiled in the conflict. It 
was reported from Boston in February 1758 that a “Broil . . . between a Mob, & some of the 
Recruiting Parties” took place and that mobs were forming against recruiting parties for 
perpetrating unscrupulous acts. “To see a Drunken Man lugg’d thro’ ye Streets on a Souldiers 
back guarded by others wither [sic] it was or was not to carry him before a Justice to swear must 
certainly give a Strong impression of ye method of enlisting & certainly have an ill effect on an 
inflam’d Mobb, “ warned Governor Thomas Pownall.xxiii Samuel Mackay reported from 
Portsmouth, Maine in December 1757: “I have had my party out in the Country but they 
generally get Mob’d; one of them was beat in the Streets the other Evening by five Sailors.”xxiv 
In Chester County, Pennsylvania that same month, John Baldwin, a tavernkeeper discovered 
Sergeant James Jobb of the New York Independent Companies attempting to enlist two young 
men in 1757. He “Swore by God that he would beat the brains of any Scoundrell [sic] Soldier” 
recruiting in his inn. Moreover, he said “God Dam [sic] Lord Loudoun and his Army too, they 
are all Scoundrells and a burden upon the Country,” and asked “What had he or his Army done 
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Since their comeing but deprived the people of their hands”? Baldwin then attacked Jobb, 
wounding him and chasing him off. He attacked him again when he discovered Jobb in another 
tavern in Wilmington.xxv Baldwin had laid his hands not only on one poor recruiting sergeant but 
also on the pulse of the conflict over recruiting: who was to control America’s labor, army 
officers or colonial masters, and to what ends, martial or material?  
Attempts to recapture men who had deserted His Majesty’s service also inflamed colonial 
passions.xxvi A crowd of people in Boston in January 1757, beat a sergeant who had captured a 
deserter from the 50th Regiment, rescued the absconder, and warned that any officers that came 
would be treated likewise.xxvii Such actions often proved to be in response to perceived 
transgressions of parties sent to recover deserters. For instance, in Sept. 1757, soldiers came to 
Hugh Brady’s door in Perth Amboy in the evening when he was in bed and his wife undressed 
and ready to go to bed. They banged on the door demanding entry, saying they were looking for 
deserters. The soldiers seized Brady’s wife when she opened the door, hit Brady with a gun butt 
on the head, wounded him in the neck and shoulder with a bayonet, and dragged him into the 
street. Several neighbors tried to liberate them, but the troops fought them off.xxviii  
The ongoing furore over recruitment in the colonies necessitated parliamentary 
intervention.xxix Before the end of March 1756, legislation had been adopted, which addressed 
the recruitment of both free individuals and indentured servants. First, the act attempted to quell 
any complaints that free men had been duped into enlisting. A recruit had to be taken to a justice 
of the peace or magistrate within four days but not before 24 hours of his listing to swear his 
willingness or unwillingness. If the latter, he had to return the levy money and pay 20s. sterling 
for expenses within 24 hours; failing this he was considered enlisted. Anyone who had taken the 
enlistment money but refused to go before a magistrate would be treated as if they had taken the 
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oath.xxx Second, the act adressed the thorny issue of recruitment of indentured servants. The 
legislation made it lawful to recruit indentured servants who volunteered, but stipulated that, if 
the owner protested within six months, the recruiting officer must either give up the servant upon 
being repaid the enlisting money, or pay the master compensation based on the original purchase 
price and the amount of time left to be served. Further, the act established that no one who 
voluntarily enlisted could be taken out of the service through legal process unless for criminal 
causes or matters of debt, thereby preventing masters from reclaiming their servants by filing 
bogus charges in a sympathetic court.xxxi Parliament with this act codified the fiscal-military 
state’s premise that the army’s need for manpower prevailed over private interest, whether 
communal or familial concern for the liberty of individuals who enlisted, or masters’ property in 
human labor for the purpose of individual economic gain. In taking this position the act 
effectively made the army the preeminent employer of labor in the colonies, at once master to 
free laborers and bonded servants purchased from reluctant owners. The recruiting legislation did 
not prevent conflict from occurring over mobilization in the colonies, as it did not remove the 
root issue of control of labor power. 
The American colonies for a variety of reasons, then, did not produce as many regular 
soldiers as the army wished, yet yielded a surplus of obstruction and outright opposition. “We 
shall have a great deal of difficulty to recruit of our Regiment,” confessed an officer, “the People 
of this Country having no great affection for a red Coat, nor do they stay long with us after they 
list when they find an opportunity to take their leave.” Another recruiting officer concurred: “the 
Generallity of the People Instead of Encouraging the Regular Service they Discourage men from 
Enlisting.” Another observed that “there is a general backwardness in the people of this province 
to the Kings service, which is but too much encouraged by all sorts of people, as they seem to 
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consider every man, we enlist, as a real loss to the Province.”xxxii Such reluctance to serve in the 
regulars played a role in Pitt’s decision to send more and more regular regiments to the North 
American theater, which in turn lessened the conflict over recruiting in the colonies, although 
crowds attacks on British soldiers occurred.xxxiii  
An account of recruiting in America gives a clear indication of the military’s role in creating 
free workers from indentured servants, apprentices and craftsmen, and of drafting existing 
laborers into a more rigorous form of manual work. Great differences existed between regions, 
most strikingly between north and south because of the latter’s growing dependence on slavery. 
But in the mid-Atlantic region and New England, the two main areas of recruitment for the army, 
petty production based upon the household in both agricultural and craft sectors proved the 
norm, with familial labor playing an important role and, particular in the mid-Atlantic, bonded 
labor making significant contributions. At the same time, labor scarcity prevailed throughout the 
colonies. Military recruitment exacerbated this situation and this clash between household 
production and state-sponsored enterprise on an Atlantic scale partly explains the at times violent 
response to mobilization. A strategem developed and long used in the colonies to overcome 
deficiencies of labor, indentured servitude figured centrally in the colonial American economy. 
First without any explicit policy, then with the backing of a British parliamentary act, the army 
“freed” many servants from bondage and introduced them to paid military labor. Although it 
promised reimbursement for the loss of contract time, cash could not immediately replace scarce 
labor. Done at the expense of masters, this theft of human capital harmed their household 
economy and sowed the seeds of discontent with the Mother Country. Similarly, the conflict over 
proper recruiting of free men had much to do with the nature of the colonial labor market. While 
ostensibly untethered workers, recruits tended to be young men with important familial and 
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community ties, with economic responsibilities to parents or employers, and enlistment in the 
regulars usually meant a loss of their labor to these networks for years. Their freedom of choice 
was thus balanced by these collective concerns, which provided a potential check on their 
unfettered movement into the military.xxxiv This loss of labor power constituted one reason why 
colonials looked more favorably upon enlistment to the provincial regiments; as the term of 
service was by the year, it was not considered as much a loss as a means of accumulating capital 
in the form of wages (paid by the colony, largely reimbursed by London) to the soldier and 
indirectly to the family and community. To the extent that the regular army (with the 
government’s backing) facilitated the recruitment of such men and their abstraction from family 
and village for longer periods, it directly impacted basic economic units. British demands for 
support thus met with American recalcitrance and outright resistance to the effort to mobilize 
manpower in the great war for empire. In the process of a massive mutual enterprise, feelings of 
difference sharpened, acquiring an edge that the infusion of funds from the British fiscal-military 
state and the shared military success of the later war years blunted, but the blade had been 
tempered and needed but another imperial crisis to whet the distinction between Briton and 
American. 
 
Quartering 
The issue of quartering troops even more acutely threw into relief the developing perceived 
differences between the authoritarian British and the unpatriotic, grasping colonists. Operating 
on the constitutional principle that the military should be subordinate to the civil power, colonists 
opposed quartering as a threat to British liberties. The annual mutiny acts passed in Britain 
stipulated that quartering could not be forced upon citizens, but the mutiny acts applied to the 
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colonies in 1723, 1754 and 1756 excised this prohibition against quartering, and left the matter in 
the hands of the commander-in-chief in North America.xxxv Beneath the discourse of 
constitutional principles there lurked a more primary concern. Liberty at root connected to 
property, and the people who were to house and provide for the soldiers deemed quartering a 
theft of property inadequately recompensed orchestrated by the military rather than a 
representative government. Such material considerations fused with higher ideals of defending 
British liberties to provoke widespread opposition to quartering in the first few years of the war, 
which military power nonetheless overturned repeatedly through the threat of force, in the 
process confirming the fears of the military and contributing to the negative image of the British. 
In the end, however, Britain’s fiscal-military state would resolve the controversy by restoring the 
separation of civil and military authority, and by borrowing money and subsidizing the building 
of barracks in America, thus taking the onus off of colonial officials and, for the most part, 
sparing individual citizens the need to accommodate soldiers. 
Lord Loudoun spluttered from Albany in 1756 that colonials had “assumed to themselves 
what they Call Rights and Priviledges, Tottaly [sic] unknown in the Mother Country and are 
made use of, for no purpose, but to screen them, from giveing any aid, of any sort, for carrying 
on the Service, and refusing us Quarters.” While Albany was the only town that had given any 
quarters for the troops, when a detachment left, they would give no quarters to them when they 
returned. Loudoun tried “by Gentle means, to get the better of this Obstinacy [sic]” for almost a 
fortnight, but the mayor informed him that he knew the law and did not have to give quarters. 
Loudoun thus determined that he would “take the Civil Magistrate along with me, If they would 
assist me, if they would not, I must Follow the Custom of Armies, and help my self.” The mayor 
remained obstinate so Loudoun had his own quartermaster pick the quarters. In the future, he 
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warned, any leading man who shuts out the troops would have his house confiscated and 
converted into a hospital or store house, “and let him shift for himself.” Later in the fall, when 
the mayor and people of Albany delayed in providing winter quarters for about 300 troops, 
Loudoun threatened to march in more battalions and to force them all on the city. The opposition 
crumbled and city officials decided to create a fund to pay citizens for quartering expenses. 
“Here, this opposition seems not to come from the lower People, but from the leading People, 
who raise the dispute in order to have a merit with the others, by defending their Liberties, as 
they call them.” Faced by an adamant Loudoun and his armed might, the opposition ultimately 
crumbled and soldiers were quartered in Albany homes.xxxvi  
The city of New York also initially failed to provide quarters for soldiers, other than in 
barracks and blockhouses. Loudoun asserted the right to quarters and in the fall of 1756 
threatened to seize them by force if necessary. The Mayor, and town council finally buckled, and 
the colonial assembly voted to build barracks for the Royal American battalion to be stationed 
there. However, Loudoun admitted that there were too many troops to rightly expect people to 
fully supply them, so he provided them with palliasses for beds and wood for their fires. But, as 
those in Albany resisted, he intended to make the citizens supply beds and wood, as he would in 
Philadelphia.xxxvii 
General Braddock had set the tone on quartering there early when in 1755, frustrated by what 
he saw as obstructionist colonial officials, he informed the Pennsylvania Assembly that he would 
exercise his power to quarter troops where he would and “take due care to burthern those 
colonies the most, that show the least loyalty to his Majesty.” Loudoun, proved equally adamant. 
“As to quarters in Philadelphia and every other place . . . where I find it necessary to have 
Troops, I have a Right to them, and must have them.”xxxviii Loudoun requested quarters from 
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Governor William Denny in Philadelphia in September 1756, and a month later gave notice that 
a battalion of the Royal Americans and an Independent company would winter there. The 
Pennsylvania Assembly responded in November, despite Denny’s best efforts, with quartering 
legislation that only provided for troops to be accommodated in public houses and not private 
homes as required by the military. Henry Bouquet, commander of the Royal American 
detachment, arrived in the town where essentially no quarters had been prepared. A new hospital 
able to hold 500 troops plus officers lay unused, but the Assembly refused to let him take 
possession. “During these Transactions, a very deep Snow fell, succeeded by a sharp Frost,” 
wrote Denny. “In this severe Weather the Troops marched into Town, the Small pox raging in 
every Part, and were crouded [sic] into public Houses, where they suffered extreme Hardships 
and caught the Infection. The Surgeons declared every House would be an Hospital, unless the 
sick were removed into one Place, and those who were less crouded and better accommodated.” 
Still 124 men “lay upon Straw” and 62 beds were wanted, but the Assembly “suffered the Men to 
lye in this miserable Condition,” while recruits continued to arrive. Fear of a smallpox epidemic 
in the city as much as concerns for British liberties prompted opposition to quartering. Denny 
wrestled mightily with the Assembly maintaining the line that the commander-in-chief was 
empowered to request quarters as needed, from private as well as public houses, while the 
Assembly’s champion, Benjamin Franklin, heroically fought the “contest for political liberty.” 
As officials in Philadelphia had not adequately quartered troops and provided none for officers, 
Loudoun, in what would become standard procedure, threatened to march troops into 
Philadelphia to take quarters by force if necessary. With that threat over their heads, the 
Assembly finally buckled, renting additional housing for the troops and freeing hospital space for 
the sick.xxxix 
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Henry Bouquet, dispatched from Philadelphia to South Carolina, discovered that southern 
climes exacted a similar toll on soldiers denied quarters. In June 1757, he arrived with five 
companies of Royal Americans in Charleston, and encamped outside town as some men had 
contracted small pox in the passage from Philadelphia. Officers applied for quarters on July 26 
“as the Troops were ill supplied with Straw, the Camp full of Water, and the Number of the Sick 
encreasing every Day,” he reported. “Four bad empty houses were given to them, where the Men 
were obliged to ly upon the Floor” until September 21, when 160 men were given quarters in 
public houses, but the rest remained where they were. Officers were not quartered until August 2. 
The Highland Battalion arrived September 3, having lost seven men in the Atlantic passage, but 
with only 16 sick men. They were only given quarters in “a half finishd [sic] Church without 
Windows, in damp Store houses upon the Quay, and in empty houses, where most of the Men 
were obliged to ly upon the Ground without Straw or any Sort of Covering. Immediate Sickness 
was the Consequence of such a Reception after so long a Voyage.” By end of September, 500 
Highlanders were sick, and 60 died within three months. The Commander of the Highlanders 
noted “this Climate Do’s not agree with our Northern Constitutions.” Some local inhabitants 
took pity on them and admitted 200 men into their homes. Securing quarters in town, Bouquet 
complained to Loudoun, proved “the eternal Struggle in America.” Despite his repeated pleas he 
had achieved no results by mid-October. “Private Interest is always the first point here, and 
Public Spirit is no more the Second,” he confided to Loudoun, and “too great a tenderness for the 
People, and too Strict an adherence to Forms in Such Circumstances, might be of great prejudice 
to the Troops.” In October the Colonial Assembly resolved to build barracks for 1,000 men but 
initially made no provision for furniture or bedding, and issued insufficient firewood. Bouquet 
complained to the governor, who took the matter to the Assembly, which agreed to provide one 
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cord of wood for every 100 soldiers, and one blanket per man, but made no further provisions for 
hospitals, guard rooms or officer quarters. xl Loudoun instructed Bouquet that if South Carolina 
did not provide sufficient quarters, he should use troops to quarter themselves on citizens, but in 
the end decided to deploy the Royal Americans to New York so as to ease the crush on 
Carolinian resources.xli Yet, as late as March 1758, not all regular officers had been provided 
with quarters or barracks.xlii 
The quartering controversy developed later in Boston because William Shirley had 
convinced the Massachusetts legislature to build barracks on Castle William Island in Boston 
harbor in 1755. When Loudoun in August 1757 informed Governor Pownall, his former 
secretary, that a regiment of soldiers would need to be quartered in the city, the legislature 
decided to pay for additional barracks to be built at Castle William to prevent quartering in 
private homes.xliii Loudoun remained unconvinced of Massachusetts’ commitment to the war 
effort, and began to voice doubts about the governor’s trustworthiness as a servant to the Crown. 
Pownall was a man:  
 
from whom I forsee more trouble to whoever commands in this Country than 
from all the People on the Continent . . . As to his Notions of what is necessary 
for an Army and the Powers that must be in the Person that commands them at the 
time that war is actually in the Country, he has formed them from a superficial 
Reading of Law at School without any Practice. Every act of a general is an 
Infringement on the Liberty of the People, and if the Civil Magistrate, does not 
furnish Carriages, every thing must stand still, and, if he does not give Quarters, 
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the Troops must perish in the Streets, but where his own power is concerned, 
there he has no Bounds.xliv  
 
All remained quiet until early November 1757 when recruiting parties were denied quarters 
in Boston. The officers had reported to Pownall who gave them a list of justices of the peace of 
whom to request accommodation, but these men told the officers that, as no law relating to 
quartering extended to the colonies, they could not be accommodated and would only quarter the 
soldiers at Castle William.xlv In fact, the Massachusetts General Court drew up An Act for 
Regulating the Militia, which stated: “No officer, Military or Civil, or other Person, shall quarter 
or billet any Soldier or Seamen upon any Inhabitant within this Province without his Consent . . . 
notwithstanding any Order whatsoever,” excepting in public houses. An £100 penalty would be 
assessed for an infraction, to be split between government and offended party. Pownall explained 
to Loudoun that the law was meant to protect “an Essential right of the Subject that no one could 
be quartered upon, unless by Law and there was no Law.” The commander-in-chief, beset by 
problems on the frontier and choleric by nature when challenged, proved in no mood to be 
lectured to on the law. If Massachusetts did not immediately settle the quartering issue, he 
warned, three battalions would march into Boston, and more if necessary. Pownall conveyed 
Loudoun’s threat to the assembly, which passed legislation empowering magistrates to provide 
quarters to recruiting parties that Pownall signed into law. An Act making provision for the 
Quartering and Billeting Recruiting Officers and Recruits stipulated that magistrates should 
provide quarters in public houses, while recruiting officers were to pay for quartering and 
provisions at rates set by Parliament. The law was to remain in effect for one year . This measure 
could not satisfy Loudoun, precluding as it did the right to quarter in private homes. By this act 
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the members of the assembly were attempting “to take away the King’s undoubted Prerogative, 
and the Rights of the Mother Country; they attempt to take away an Act of the Brittish [sic] 
Parliament: they attempt to make it impossible for the King either to keep Troops in North 
America, or if he had them in his Forts to make it impossible for him to march them thro’ his 
own Dominions either for the Defence of those Dominions, or for the Protection of the Lives and 
Properties of his Subjects.”xlvi If he were to acquiesce, Loudoun maintained, every other colony 
would follow Massachusetts’s lead.xlvii For it’s part, the Assembly reaffirmed that adequate 
quarters had been provided in the barracks on Castle Island, and that provision of additional 
quarters elsewhere must first be voted for by the government, which act they were willing to 
produce, but reminded the governor “the inhabitants of this Province are intitled [sic] to the 
Natural Rights of English born Subjects.”xlviii Pownall was not unsympathetic with this position. 
At this juncture, he wrote Loudoun: “in a Free Government where there is a Public Legislature 
and people Act by their Representatives, a Governor must endeavor to lead those people for he 
cannot drive them . . . Your Lordships Situation is very different--Your Lordships [sic] has not 
only Power, but the uncontrouled means of executing it, whenever you shall think it prudent to 
exert such.” Loudoun’s threat of settling the quartering dispute with troops if implemented would 
alienate the people from the military, Pownall maintained. Already he as governor had been 
implicated with the army and some alleged they conspired to impose a military government. For 
whatever reason, Loudoun wrote on December 26 that he had decided to countermand his orders 
to march troops into Massachusetts.xlix  
For the first time in the quartering wars Loudoun retreated and allowed the Massachusetts’ 
law to stand. Although he claimed victory for asserting the army’s prerogative, he in fact yielded 
the presumed right of the military to quarter soldiers in private homes. The defeat no doubt 
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further entrenched his negative view of colonials, while his authoritarian approach, however 
much grounded in imperial policy, made the British-American relationship ever more bilious, as 
did the actions of certain individual soldiers quartered in private homes.  
While typically dealt with in constitutional terms at the level of colonial governance, on the 
ground the quartering issue involved property rights and the matter of personal safety. At best, 
quartering purloined provisions and control of personal space from citizens with the promise of 
reimbursement; at its worse, it was as if ones home had been invaded by members of a looting 
army. Officers hardly set a good example. An official in Elizabeth Town, New Jersey warned 
Loudoun in January 1757, that people in the colonies were unused to “War and martial 
Discipline,” and thus “to prevent Tumults and Disturbances between Your Officers and the 
Inhabitants where the Troops are quarter’d I hope You Lordship will give the strictest Orders for 
Moderation and Lenity to be exercised at all Times.” This request went for naught. In March, 
various citizens of Elizabeth Town made complaints against Captain Porter of the Royal 
American Grenadiers and his conduct towards local residence. He bought three barrels of cider 
but would not pay the agreed price when delivered, argued with a local citizen and struck him 
with fist and sword. Also, a landlord complained a foreign captain of the 3rd Battalion of the 
same regiment threatened to cut his head off and beat his wife because she would not roast a 
sheep for him.l It is not any wonder then, that private soldiers sometimes took advantage of their 
strength in numbers while quartered on the public. In the fall of 1756, a company of Royal 
Americans was ordered into quarters in George Town, Maryland. A group of these soldiers 
moved into a house owned by William Wethered in November and on January 17, through their 
carelessness he alleged, the house burnt down, together with a storehouse, stables, fencing, a 
garden adjoining house, and two small houses that were pulled down to prevent the fire 
 22
spreading. Wethered sought reimbursement, and Governor Horatio Sharpe, as desired by 
Loudoun, persuaded the Assembly to pay him £300 for his house.li Shortly thereafter in 
Charlestown, Maryland, two companies of soldiers took over John Kirkpatrick’s house and 
outbuilding for barracks. They totally wrecked the premises, burning floors and doors and 
ruining brickwork. He complained several times to their captains, who treated him derisively. 
The worth of the house he put at £500 and the outbuilding at £70.lii In November 1757, Jannetie 
Ten Eyck petitioned Loudoun that since the beginning of the war her house in Albany has been 
full with stores, officers and soldiers. At that time a sergeant and three men quartered there, 
“who use her with insufferable Inssolence, threat’ning, to take the Bed whereon She lays, or 
come to Bed to her, tho’ she hath already . . . given them the Straw bed from under her.” They 
also threatened to cut the doors and windows if she did not find them firewood, for which she 
was obliged to the kindness of her neighbors, being upwards of 50 years old, weak and sickly, 
and with no man to assist her. She begged relief from the commander-in-chief.liii Threats of 
violence could be eclipsed by actual physical violence. Governor Fitch of Connecticut 
complained that in March 1758, some of Simon Fraser’s Highlanders grievously wounded a 
citizen, and Captain John McDonald refused to give up the culprits when legally summoned. 
Fitch asked for an investigation, and if the facts support this version of events, the men to be 
handed over to civil authorities for trial. The army needed to make an example of soldiers who 
do such things, he maintained, otherwise it would only give ammunition to the cries against 
quartering.liv 
While these incidents of property damage and violence, threatened and real, were not the 
norm, they proved notorious enough to give a more personal dimension to the opposition to 
quartering. The clergy referenced the conflict in their preachings. In one published sermon 
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preached to regular officers and soldiers in 1759 at Elizabeth Town, the site of quartering 
conflict with the army the year before, the reverend offered a biblical rebuke to the congregation. 
Although King David of Israel was a brave soldier, he was not violent in disposition and “was 
not inclined to take away the property of his countrymen by force of arms, without asking their 
consent, and contrary to reason and law.” In Philadelphia, another hotbed of the quartering 
controversy, Rev. William Smith sermonized the Royal American forces on the evil of 
committing violence against their fellow subjects or terrifying them so as to take their money on 
penalty of forfeiting their salvation.lv 
The quartering controversy, part constitutional crisis and part interpersonal conflict, powered 
a cultural clash in the British-American relationship. British funding of the war effort would 
paper over the issue, but left the root problems unresolved. When Parliament finally legislated a 
quartering act for the colonies in 1765, that allowed for quartering in private homes if barracks 
and taverns provided insufficient space, the controversy erupted again with more enduring 
consequences.  
 
Conclusion 
The rupture between British military power, embodied by John Campbell, Fourth Earl of 
Loudoun, and American colonial civil authority, most clearly rendered by Thomas Pownall, 
Governor of Massachusetts, distracted the army from war-making and threatened defeat for the 
empire. Acting on his orders and willing to exercise the vice regal powers granted him, Lord 
Loudoun sought to impose a unified military order on the colonies.lvi Colonial leaders refused to 
yield the powers they believe civil authorities wielded and chafed at the military’s air of 
superiority. Recognizing this danger, William Pitt resolved the standoff largely in favor of the 
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colonial governments. By December 1757, he decided no longer to treat the colonies as wholly 
subordinate political entities subject to forced contributions to a common war fund, but rather in 
a manner analogous to allies whose contributions to the war effort would be subsidized by 
Whitehall. Moreover, Loudoun’s successor as commander-in-chief would not wield direct 
control over colonial governments, which once again fell under the control of the secretary of 
state for the Southern Department.lvii With these decisions, Pitt eased both the economic and 
constitutional sources of military-colonial tensions, and enlisted more wholehearted American 
support of the war. 
More so than in the recognition of cultural difference, the seeds of American identity lay in 
the collision of Britain’s fiscal-military state and the economic realities of the American 
colonies. Competition over scarce resources such as manpower or the physical plant and food 
products of colonial farms, and the forced insertion of soldiers in colonists’ homes where their 
pressed hoists were to provide for them sparked conflict. This conflict quickly fed into the 
political arena where the peculiar ways of colonial governance generated incipient constitutional 
arguments against British rules. It is important to remember, however, that Parliament assuaged 
most of these tensions by reining in the excesses of recruitment and funding the war effort from 
1758, while the series of victories that began in that year bred a sense of British fellowship. To 
imagine Crevecoeur’s American striding forth from the Seven Years’ War on a planned march to 
the Revolution is to commit the grosses of sins, conjuring teleology not writing history. 
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